Dignity
and Democracy
by
David
Montgomery
"I tell you this," said
Nick DiGaetano in 1959, reflecting on his twenty years as a shop-floor militant
in the United Auto Workers at Detroit's Chrysler Jefferson plant, "the workers of my generation
from the early days up to now had what you might call a labor insurrection in
changing from a plain, humble, submissive creature into a man."1
DiGaetano had put his finger on the heart of the labor movement's contribution
to life in twentieth-century United States. Through collective action women and men learned to overcome both
the subservience to bosses and the rivalry with each other that had been
instilled by their need for a job. Together they achieved some mastery over
their own lives within the impersonal and "market-driven"
institutions of the modern economy. For all the shortcomings, contradictions,
and reversals evident in the labor movement's complex history, that achievement
remains its most important legacy for denizens of the century to come. It is,
therefore, the main target of the systematic assault now being waged in the
name of the “market economy” against every form of human collective activity.
The union movement has been but one
of many forms of group solidarity used by working people during this century to
gain some control over the uncertain circumstances under which they tried to
make a living and raise children. Workers have also called on family
connections, racial and ethnic organizations, women's organizations, and
neighborhood networks; and they have been aided by individuals who enjoyed some
influence with local employers, such as clergy, politicians, labor contractors,
and social workers. At times those
intermediaries served as alternatives to labor unions or were even enlisted in
anti-union campaigns. In many other instances, however, some or all of them
provided important threads in the fabric of union strength and vitality. In
fact, during every period when union membership and influence expanded rapidly
in the United States (1898 to 1903, 1916 to 1920, 1937 to 1947, and–in the
public sector–1962 to 1975), other social networks that framed the lives of
members and potential members had also become energized for social change.
As the twentieth century comes to a
close, corporate executives and business-sponsored think tanks are engaged in a
systematic campaign to privatize governmental undertakings and to pulverize all
human bondings and collectives that stand in the way of individual choice in
buying or selling products, services, talents, and personal futures. Social
security, poor relief, education, the creation and dissemination of ideas, the
punishment of criminals, and the care of the sick and infirm are all targeted
for conversion into profit-making enterprises. For free market true believers,
social networks are but focus groups, to be used in shaping advertising and
electoral campaigns.
But we are social beings. The
dignity and self-respect of which Nick DiGaetano spoke were won by people
thinking through what measures would promote everyone's welfare and then acting
together to achieve the goals on which they had agreed. Although workers could
not create the world they wanted, they did honeycomb the ruthlessly competitive
industrial order with practices based on their own egalitarian and social
values. Through solidarity and deliberation, workers won for themselves a voice
in determining the conditions of their employment, running their government,
setting important constraints on the arbitrary authority of their bosses, and
gaining time to spend as they wanted. Only through solidarity now and in the
future they will be able to fend off the peril to our community life and
physical environment lurking behind the free market utopia illustion.
A Voice at
Work
Although what nineteenth-century
Americans called the labor question had shaped American life and thought from
the struggle against chattel slavery through the great strikes of the late
1800s, it was only during the first two decades of the 1900s that union
membership grew by bursts to more than one-fifth of all nonagricultural
workers. The twentieth century had opened with a surge of economic growth,
which provided a happy contrast with the protracted depression of the 1890s.
Key features of that growth were the consolidations of corporate enterprise and
of global empires, which decisively framed the contours and goals of the labor
movement.
A wave of mergers combined formerly
competing firms in steel, farm machinery, meatpacking, electrical equipment,
and other industries, though women's clothing, bituminous coal, and cotton
textiles remained highly competitive. By 1909 fewer than 5 percent of all firms
in manufacturing (all of them corporations) employed more that 62 percent of
manufacturing workers in the United States. Leading business figures explicitly repudiated their
predecessors' faith in unfettered price competition.
The ascendant Republicans campaigned
as guardians of "The Full Dinner Pail" and lost control of Washington only when they fell out among themselves over major questions of
economic and social policy. European immigrants crossed the Atlantic in record
numbers, while investment capital from North America and Europe poured into the world's more
southerly regions to extract their diamonds, gold, copper, rubber, coffee, tea,
and sugar for use at home. Conflicts among expanding empires made governing
officials and intellectuals in all the “Great Powers” seek ways not only to
improve their countries' military and naval strength but also their citizens,
health, social cohesiveness, and patriotic ardor.
But the consolidation of business and empires did not end the
ruthless competition for jobs faced by workers. They knew all too well that the
celebrated right of the individual to quit a job and seek another had precious
little impact on the way either sweatshops or great corporations treated their
workers. Union membership swelled from barely four hundred thousands in 1897 to
more than two million by 1904, only to be held in check by fierce employer
resistance for the next decade. Coal miners and workers in construction and
transportation spearheaded the expansion, but scarcely an industry or region
remained untouched by the proliferation of craft unions. Although a deservedly
famous wave of strikes between 1909 and 1913 brought only a modest increase in
union membership, the prominence of women, recent immigrants, and unskilled
workers on picket lines and the dramatic tactics evident in mass strikes
heralded the advent of what the socialist writer William English Walling called
"a revolution in the labor movement," rooted in mass-production
industries and vast urban working-class neighborhoods. It also brought
politicians scurrying to address the need for "industrial democracy."
The full employment created by World
War I unleashed seven years of the most intense and continuous strike activity
in the country's history, from 1916 to 1922. The skilled and unskilled; men and
women; African Americans, whites, Latinos, and Asian Americans;, and even many
clerical and public employees joined in strikes (though often clashing, rather
than cooperating, with one another). Union membership grew by 1920 to a larger
percentage of the labor force (19.5%) than would be reached again until 1937
(22%). While the country was at war, important federal agencies encouraged
unionization, especially in the mining, railroad, clothing, and armaments
industries.
No sooner had the armistice been
signed, however, than government bodies supervising mines, railroads, and
shipbuilding turned hostile to union demands in the name of fighting inflation.
Meanwhile, executives in other industries simply ignored decrees that had
emanated from now defunct wartime agencies. During the huge strikes of 1919 the
tide turned decisively against the labor movement. Then two years of massive
unemployment, starting in midsummer 1920, enabled employers to savage the
earnings and savings workers had acquired during the war and to gut union
strength in basic industries by the end of 1922.
When workers organized during those
tumultuous years, they did not use the language of "industrial
relations," which was then coming into vogue in management circles and
business schools (much like today's discourse of "human resources
management"). On the contrary, strikers' own rhetoric and the
proclamations of both the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW) couched workers' claims in terms not only of freedom
of speech and assembly but also of the
historic overthrow of slavery and involuntary servitude. "There never yet
existed coincident with each other autocracy in the shop and democracy in
political life," Samuel Gompers had admonished the AFL in 1894.2
The AFL's 1918 convention upheld the right of "the workers
everywhere" to "organize into trade unions," so as to prevent
having their lives at work and their incomes governed by "arbitrary and
autocratic whim." It demanded "effective legislation . . . which
would make it a criminal offense for any employer to interfere with or hamper the
exercise of this right or to interfere with the legitimate activities of trade
unions."3
Union activists of all political persuasions charged that statutes
and court rulings outlawing strikes violated the constitutional prohibition of
involuntary servitude, while bans on picketing or boycotts infringed on freedom
of speech and assembly. They refused on principle to obey such rulings. Even
though the AFL’s Gompers thought that the only legitimate purpose of strikes
was to secure inviolable contracts, and William D. Haywood of the IWW argued
that workers should never contract away their ability to strike, both men
contended that freedom to organize and to strike was the most elemental human
right in an industrial country. Black and white coal miners in Kansas acted on
that belief when they resolved in 1921 that they "would rather go to
prison than to be a party to enslaving the workers of this State" and,
therefore, disobeyed a new state law against strikes. Some twenty-five hundred
women marched in support of the men, whom they depicted as "striking
against a law to enslave our children."4
A Voice in
Political Life
Once working-class activists turned
from the demand that government leave workers free to act on their own behalf
and focused on questions of how the labor movement should involve itself in the
political arena and for what goals, however, their concord gave way to sharp
disagreements. On the eve of the war, socialists, who could muster a third of
delegates' votes at AFL conventions, argued that labor should try to win
control of the government and then institute public ownership and management of
all major industries. Pure-and-simple unionists replied that workers could best
improve their lot by imposing union standards on privately owned enterprises.
The IWW contended that through direct action workers of all types could win
immediate improvements and could ultimately take possession of their
workplaces.
But wartime appeals to fighting for
democracy and wartime demonstrations of governmental power reshaped disputes
over political action within the movement. As union membership in mass
production swelled, so did the strength of a "progressive" bloc,
based in the mininig, railroad, machinist, maritime, textile, and clothing
unions, and in many city central labor unions. Progressives advocated public
ownership of railroads and coal mines, a thirty-hour week, state or national
health insurance and old-age pensions, the release of all wartime political
prisoners, and diplomatic recognition of the revolutionary governments of
Mexico and Russia.
The champions of a more inclusive
and assertive unionism also sought to dismantle the empires that dominated the
world, to reduce the burden of armaments, and to democratize international
diplomacy. They lent special support to independence for Ireland and India, and
they cultivated their own economic relations with Soviet Russia and Mexico, in
defiance of the bans imposed by the U.S. government. The journal of the Chicago
Federation of Labor protested, in words that resonate for our own time:
"American capitalism intends to establish once and for all, that foreign
governments are of no consequence whatever when they stand in the way of . . .
capitalists."5 Robert M. La Follette, whom labor supported for
U.S. president in 1924, proclaimed the paramount issue of his campaign to be
breaking the grip of "private monopoly" at home and its twin
"dollar diplomacy" abroad.
No part of labor's own legacy proved more damaging to all these
efforts on behalf of democracy at home and abroad, however, than the
deep-rooted custom within its ranks of identifying "labor" with white
men and depicting people of color as instruments of rapacious capital–as
"cheap labor." Black,
Japanese, Filipino, and Mexican workers on America's docks, railroads, and
farms were more likely before the 1930s to form their own unions or segregated
locals within national unions than to be welcomed into those dominated by
whites. Every year the few black delegates to AFL conventions protested in vain
against the exclusive practices of many constituent unions and against the
federation's failure to challenge the legal disfranchisement and segregation of
African Americans. The IWW had also consistently denounced and ridiculed racist
practices.
Even more devastating were the murderous attacks by many thousands
of white workers on their black neighbors, from the East St. Louis race riot of
1917 through the bloody 1921 destruction of the African-American community in
Tulsa, Oklahoma. At times, as in Chicago in 1919, the city's labor movement
denounced the assaults but failed to mount any effective opposition. At other
times, as in East St. Louis, white rioters actually assembled in union halls.
Even the machinists and the railroad brotherhoods, which played prominent roles
in progressive politics, barred nonwhites from membership. Moreover, they used
their influence on the Railway Labor Board to see to it, in the words of the
Attorney Charles Hamilton Houston, arguing on behalf of the excluded workers, "that
the Negro's work ends where the machine begins."6
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) participated in the Conference for Progressive Political Action,
despite the exclusive practices of some of its constituent unions. The 1924
campaign handbook, The Facts about La Follette and Wheeler, advocated
"all the rights and privileges of citizenship" for African Americans
and contended that "if twelve million Americans can be disfranchised,
driven from decent employment, lynched and insulted because of race and color,
no class of American citizens is really safe." But white supremacy remained firmly
institutionalized within the labor movement, as well as in the Democratic Party
and in society at large. No aspect of the reshaping of labor's legacy by the
new industrial unions of the 1930s proved more important than their policies of
enrolling workers of any race, gender, or occupation and of openly fighting for
civil and political rights for African Americans, Mexicans, and Asians.
Unions and
Intellectuals
The
progressive impulse in the labor movement attracted the support of prominent
writers and scholars. Even while the union movement declined in strength, a
workers' education movement grew within unions and labor colleges, most
notably, Brookwood College in upstate New York. The Workers' Education Bureau
operated in tandem with the monthly magazine Labor Age, founded in 1921. It was
edited by the Catholic scholar Louis F. Budenz, and its diverse board of
directors was chaired by James H. Maurer, the socialist president of the
Pennsylvania Federation of Labor.
The crusty
socialist humorist Oscar Ameringer explained the connection between
developments in academia and those in the labor movement:
We had a rich vein to mine. The best professional brains of the
nation were in those post-war days quartered in academic doghouses. . . . Just
after the war, fugitives from the chain gang of Nicholas Murray Butler [of
Columbia University], and others, as distinguished as Professors Charles Beard,
John Dewey, and the many-times-exiled Thorstein Veblen, were putting new life
into old academic bones.7
Although these prominent scholars contributed to many labor papers,
no single union attracted more support and involvement than the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America. Its educational director, J. B. S. Hardman,
assembled thirty two union activists and supporters, most of them connected to
Brookwood College, to produce in 1928 an assessment of the state of the labor
movement and proposals for its revitalization. The book American Labor
Dynamics in the Light of Post-War Developments previewed the strategies and
tactics that would characterize labor's resurgence in the 1930s. Those essays
reflected a surge of efforts between 1926 and 1930 by Brookwood staff and
students and by the Communist Party to sink roots of industrial unions in
automobile works, steel mills, and southern textile mills. From within the
hobbled and shrinking labor movement of the "Coolidge Prosperity,"
new thinking and new forms of action were laying the foundations of a
revitalized labor movement. That revival, coupled with the emergence of
writers, musicians, and graphic artists with roots in immigrant and
African-American life, in turn gave rise to an unprecedented flowering of
American cultural life during the thirties, rooted in the vitality and
struggles of the working class.8
A New
Generation Made Itself Heard
The resurgence of union strength and influence during the 1930s
added new ingredients to labor's legacy both through its accomplishments and
through such defeated efforts as the thirty-hour work week, universal social
insurance, and federal licensing of corporations, which remain parts of our
century's thwarted but still appropriate agenda for social improvement. The
older men and women whose actions reshaped American industrial, political, and
cultural life were themselves veterans of the postwar battles. But a younger
generation was also much in evidence, and its role grew as the thirties
progressed. The youthful activists were products of American urban life after
the entrance of new immigrants from Europe had been reduced to a trickle, entry
of Asians barred completely (except Filipinos, before 1934), and millions of
black and white Americans had left farmlands to seek a better life in town.
The younger generation was also likely to complete high school.
Indeed, the brutal unemployment wave of the 1930s enabled companies to require
a secondary education for anyone they hired. Paradoxically, the public schools
had infused a common culture among the descendants of many different lands,
although the children of immigrants also remembered these schools as cultural
battlegrounds. Mexican-American organizations, which were closely linked to the
new industrial unions, drew heavily on an educated cadre, whose school
experiences had been especially bitter.9 A remarkable number of the
industrial union vanguard had even had a taste of college education, before the
depression drove them from the classroom. The sociologist C. Wright Mills found
in 1946 that the average schooling of CIO leaders was slightly over twelve
years, in contrast to nine years for officers of older craft unions. Unions did
not then need to recruit organizers on college campuses, nor did workers' education
any longer rely on creative but beleaguered professors. Hardship had driven
would-be students toward factory gates, where their youth and education often
made them more attractive to employers than others who were clamoring for the
same jobs.10
The struggles of young workers and their elders made American
political life during the 1930s very different from that of other lands. Most
independent countries of Europe, Asia, and Latin America responded to the
depression by turning sharply to the right. Those that did not fall under
fascist rule installed conservative regimes or national coalition governments.
Thus, the short-lived swing to the left under Popular Front governments in
France and Spain, and the more durable one in Chile, stand out as brief moments
of hope in a war-bound world of reactionary nationalism and closed empires. In
the United States, however, party rivalries for office remained vigorous,
right-wing nationalism was confined to the role of opposition (epitomized by
the Hearst press), and official policy actually encouraged workers of all races
in manufacturing and mining to organize.
Despite the grip of the segregationist South on the Democratic
Party, most American workers saw the new deal as a ray of hope, not only during
the depression but also later, during World War II and the cold war. That
belief also became an important part of labor's legacy, fueling both reform
impulses and union support for the government's foreign policy.
Civil
Society, Desegregation, and Economic Planning
Three aspects of labor's New Deal are especially important to
recall today. First, despite the major expansion of the role of the state,
workers acted on their own behalf in reforming life on the job. Second,
African-American and Chicano workers used the new unions and their political
links for an increasingly comprehensive assault on the institutionalized
practice of white supremacy. Third, the new unions articulated a vision of
government committed to providing jobs, goods, and services where the market economy
had failed and to making security of income a basic entitlement of citizenship.
The writer Steven Fraser was certainly right to argue that
"the CIO was a quintessentially political creature whose origins and fate
were entirely bound up with the rising and receding of the 'second New Deal.'
"11 The connection was a two-way street. Unions continued to
run their own affairs, in the American tradition, while the ranks of labor
produced political tribunes at all levels of government. Labor kept wage
bargaining in its own hands by lobbying against efforts in Congress to
legislate wage scales (beyond establishing a minimum wage and requiring
prevailing wages on government contracts). Moreover, the decisive breakthrough
of unionization occurred before the Wagner Act of 1935 went into effect: the
victorious strike of the Pacific Coast Maritime Federation, the General Motors
sit-downs, and union recognition at United States Steel and Schenectady General
Electric.
The Wagner Act prohibited interference by employers with workers'
efforts to unionize and provided for certification of bargaining agents chosen
by a majority of the workers. The crucial point about the law, however, is that
it encouraged workers to act for themselves. It is hard to imagine another act of
Congress since the Thirteenth Amendment that did as much to invigorate civil
society. The original point of the law was majestically simple: workers who
wanted a union could form one without any interference from the boss, and the
government's role was to facilitate their choice, not to make it.
Over the years court decisions, new legislation, and National Labor
Relations Board rulings have fenced in that freedom of workers to exercise
their own voice, while allowing employers and government ever-greater roles in
the decision-making process. Those developments make it easy to forget the
crucial lesson of the 1930s: government action can take forms that expand the
domain of human freedom.
That lesson was powerfully reinforced by the struggle for civil
rights. Harry Truman expressed that point clearly in June 1947 when he became
the first president ever to address a convention of the NAACP and explained
that "new concepts of civil rights" meant "not protection of the
people against the Government, but protection of the people by the
Government."12 That a president belonging to the Democratic
Party–the historic party of white supremacy–should make such a pledge was a
compelling tribute to the political impact of working people and their unions
on American life at midcentury.
The Great Depression had actually reduced the number of African
Americans working in industry, while New Deal agricultural programs had
stimulated the removal of sharecroppers from the land. Consequently, the major
demands of black working people during the thirties focused on winning access
to jobs and ending police brutality and lynchings. These aspirations galvanized
popular support behind the March on Washington Movement and behind innumerable
local initiatives to make use of the Fair Employment Practices Commission.
Although many black and Chicano workers had participated in forming the new
unions, it was the war economy and the ensuing migration to the cities that
both increased their influence in union ranks and drew CIO unions into a broad
range of struggles to end segregation and undermine the influence over the
Democratic Party wielded by southern foes of labor's program.
In May 1943, President Philip Murray contributed to a major public
debate on war aims in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch by calling for a
"substantial down payment on the Four Freedoms," starting with
democracy in the American South. The CIO's 1946 convention elaborated that call
with resolutions favoring concerted action within every union against job
discrimination, a federal law against lynching (noting that twenty six African
Americans had been lynched since V-J Day), a campaign to register black voters
in the South, and a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission with powers
to enforce its rulings. These demands encountered formidable resistance from
within the ranks of white workers and craft unions, while a crusade by business
groups to "unleash enterprise" prevented the enactment of any of the
CIO's 1946 legislative demands.
Subsequently, the decisive action for civil rights unfolded outside
the arena provided by the labor movement, and civil rights activists became
increasingly critical of the merged AFL-CIO, especially after the 1958
recession produced severe long-term loss
of industrial jobs. Nevertheless, the assistance some major unions lent to
civil disobedience against segregation and joint lobbying efforts in support of
the civil rights acts of 1963 and 1964 produced a high watermark of alliance
between union leadership and civil rights organizations.13
Labor in
Deep Freeze
By the time the civil rights laws were enacted, the union movement
was losing members in manufacturing, mining, and construction. Also, the cold
war had curbed the activities and aspirations the movement had manifested at
the close of the war. With a third of the labor force unionized by 1946,
strikers had shut down all basic industries and won major wage increases, while
beating back employers' demands for greater managerial authority. The strike
wave featured massive acts of solidarity, including citywide general strikes by
organized workers helping others form or preserve new unions in Rochester,
Stamford, Lancaster, Pittsburgh, and Oakland. Congress had replied with the
1947 Taft-Hartley law, which banned mass picketing, sympathetic strikes, and
secondary boycotts, while once again authorizing federal injunctions against
strikes.
The CIO's November 1946 convention had translated the spirit of
those strikers into an audacious program of legislative and bargaining demands
designed to reshape the postwar economy around the needs of working people. The
program was also designed to institute United Nations control of atomic
explosives and civilian development of atomic energy, while fostering
"continued unity" of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet
Union (especially among their trade
unions), for the sake of "the continued existence of the human race."
If almost twenty years elapsed between the CIO's 1946 demand for
legislation securing voting rights and equal employment and their enactment,
the portions of its program dealing with economic planning and social insurance
not only went down to defeat but passed out of the public memory. Murray had
argued in 1946 that leaving the economy to be directed by market forces alone
meant that first priority in allocation of resources would go to satisfying the
desires of people who had lots of money. He called for economic planning to
favor the needs of working people, federal funding for a complete system of
natal and child care, and single-payer national health insurance. While cold
war anticommunism provided business the cover for loud and effective
denunciations of these proposals, it also hobbled labor's efforts to campaign
in their favor. The turn of CIO unions toward negotiating health coverage and
pensions directly with corporations signaled their weakness on the political
front. It was, in fact, the AFL that kept alive the battle for national health
insurance through the 1950s, because so many of its members worked for
employers who were too small to institute corporate benefits packages.
Productivity became the watchword of
American public discourse. Workers' memories of the hardships of prewar life, a
drumbeat of media demands to "unleash enterprise," and the insistence
of the government and of both political parties that communism could be rolled
back only by a strategy that combined military might with rapid economic
development all lent credence to the cult of productivity. As it turned out per capita output in
industrialized countries (including those under Communist rule) grew between
the late 1940s and the early 1970s at a pace rivaled only by the industrial
expansion of 1848 to 1875. Beginning with the highly publicized 1948
"Treaty of Detroit" between General Motors and the United Auto
Workers, union wages were commonly pegged to the index of productivity
improvement for the economy as a whole, in return for union acknowledgment of
management's prerogatives in the quest for ever-higher output. Trade unionists
who continued to espouse class struggle had difficulty in surviving
investigations by the FBI and congressional committees, noncommunist
affidavits, security clearances, IRS audits, Smith Act indictments, and NLRB
rulings that flagrantly favored their less controversial union rivals.
Despite the Taft-Hartley Act, union strength in American
manufacturing grew to its all-time peak (42 percent) in 1953, and pattern
bargaining kept wages abreast of increases in productivity while also reducing
regional pay differentials and inducing nonunion employers to reshape their own
personnel practices along the lines that unions had established. Median family
incomes doubled between 1950 and 1973. A steady rise in the labor force
participation of women was both an effect and a major cause of this
advancement: by 1981 46.6 percent of the income of families with moderate
earnings ($15000 to $19,000) was contributed by women, as was 69 percent of low
family incomes (under $10,000). Bargaining over fringe benefits, legitimated by
the Supreme Court at the end of the 1940s, infringed on the domain in which
corporations had cultivated "the loyal employee" but kept pensions
and medical payments tied to the job. The associated costs mounted, businesses
have battled fiercely to unload them during the 1990s.
Both labor federations lent their support to the foreign policy of
"containing Communism," enunciated by President Truman and continued
by his successors. By 1949 the CIO had expelled nine unions that refused to
conform and led an anticommunist secession from the World Federation of Trade
Unions, which it had hailed in 1945 and 1946 as the touchstone of workers'
hopes for a just and peaceful world. Under the direction of Jay Lovestone, the
AFL-CIO pursued both overt and covert anticommunist activities in every
continent.
By the end of the 1950s few prominent intellectuals associated
their hopes for social reform with the workers' movement. The influential
sociologist Daniel Bell wrote that, despite abundant evidence of
"discontent" in the workplace, the "publics" that defined
political life no longer took shape around the relations of production, and
reform initiatives were led by "cosmopolitan" elites, over the
opposition of the "localistic" popular masses.14 When the
Johnson administration proposed a War on Poverty, its economic adviser Walter
Heller contended that "the poor inhabit a world scarcely recognizable . .
. by the majority of their fellow Americans."15 No longer did
academic discourse even make poverty part of "the labor question."
The New Left followed suit. It drew its inspiration from the
personal commitment of the men and women in the civil rights movement to active
repudiation of the oppression, inequality, and inhibitions embedded in postwar
life. The 1962 Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS) issued a ringing summons to a moral revitalization of American society,
but (unlike European student movements) it envisaged no role for the working
class or organized labor in that effort, despite the financial aid and
expressions of support the SDS had received from some major unions.
The alienation of radical intellectuals from labor was converted to
venomous hostility by the war in Vietnam. At the December 1965 San Francisco
convention of the AFL-CIO, not a single delegate arose to oppose the official
support for President Lyndon Johnson's foreign policy. Students from San
Francisco State and from the University of California at Berkeley, who were
watching from the galleries, became increasingly irate at the onesided
proceedings, shouted slogans against the war, and finally began to chant:
"Debate! Debate! Debate!"
In response delegates on the floor shouted "Get out of here!"
and "Get a haircut!" The interchange was cut short when George Meany
pounded down his gavel and ordered: "Will the sergeant at arms clear these
kookies out of the gallery."16
Over the next five years, however, calls for an end to the carnage
became increasingly loud within major unions, while growing numbers of students
aided rank-and-file struggles of workers, despite the famous hard-hat assaults
against peace demonstrators in May 1970. The huge demonstrations of October and
November 1969 calling for a Moratorium on the war were endorsed by a dozen
major unions and drew enormous crowds, regardless of the tension between union
delegations and the radicalized student contingents. Robert Kennedy's victories
in the 1968 presidential primaries of Illinois and California revealed the
possibility of a popular coalition that might have redefined American
liberalism and brought the war to an end. His assassination on the very day of
his triumph in California cut that prospect short.
Throughout these years, however, workers' demands for economic
improvements remained irrepressible (as did their informal challenges to
managerial authority on the shop floor). Moreover, union membership grew in the
public and service sectors, offsetting its shrinking base in manufacturing,
augmenting the numbers of women and people of color in labor's ranks, and
fueling the demands for pay equity. After 1968 what British economist E. H.
Phelps-Brown called "a pay explosion" driven by rank-and-file
militancy in both Western Europe and the United States pushed up wages faster
than productivity could rise, provoking a major contraction in returns to
capital invested in production and trade by 1973, and producing a season of
wage freezes and income policies. Businesses responded by moving manufacturing
operations out of the country, shifting capital into the lower-paid service sector
and into finance, and aggressively demanding concessions and
"flexibility" from unions.
By the 1980s strikers could again expect to see scabs herded
through their picket lines and to stay out for month after hungry month.
Strikes involving more than 1,000 workers dropped from a then normal level of
381 in 1970 to 54 by 1985 and 32 in 1995. Total union membership in the private
sector fell from its 1953 high of 37.5 percent to 12.1 percent by 1994.
Employers both scoffed at NLRB charges of unfair labor practices and counted on
Nixon's and Reagan's appointees to change NLRB rules in their favor. Even in
historically unionized corporations, ever-growing numbers of workers became
“independent contractors” or employees of subcontractors, entitled to none of
the benefits once designed to stabilize the workforce. Nonunion competitors now
set the pattern to which unions were expected to conform. While productivity
resumed its upward climb, the living standards of average Americans no longer
rose with it.
The assault on unions was coupled with ringing denunciations of
everything done by government (except jailing more criminals). The combined
impact of military spending and transfer payments to secure domestic stability
had made budget deficits front-page news by 1975, when New York City faced
bankruptcy and Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon seized the occasion
to launch a crusade against the politics of extravagance, thus plotting the
political trajectory later identified with Newt Gingrich. Within two years
Simon could boast that even liberal state governors, like Jerry Brown, Michael
Dukakis, and Ella Grasso, had made "fiscal responsibility" their
political slogan. In response, the AFL-CIO cultivated coalitions with
African-American, women's, and environmentalist organizations in defense of the
embattled public sector.
By the 1990s corporate executives (who were also under relentless
pressure to produce ever greater profits) could treat the whole world as their
oyster. International treaties and funding agencies could now accomplish the
goal of which the Chicago Federation of Labor had warned back in 1920: ensuring
"that foreign governments are of no consequence whatever when they stand
in the way of . . . capitalists."
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the government
experimented with new actions to resolve social conflicts in the world center
of manufacturing. But the century had ended with the rapid dismantling and
dispersal of the production that had generated union growth and with an assault
on "big government" as the driving force of national and
international politics.
An
Industrial Legacy for a Service Economy?
A voice on the job and in government, explicit and enforceable
standards for wages and for treatment, freedom from racial subjugation, time to
enjoy life and participate in society, pursuit of a foreign policy shaped
around workers' needs, and a government committed to securing the daily needs
of all its
people–these
aspirations generated by the labor movement during the first three-quarters of
this century are all under attack as the new millennium approaches. They remain
as meaningful and necessary as ever to all but the most privileged men and
women. But just as capitalist development has created and then destroyed the
social foundations of successive waves of workers' struggles in the past, so it
has left labor's legacy in the hands not only of the shrinking numbers of
people in older craft and industrial unions but also and increasingly of
millions of people who toil in newer settings.
According to the World Bank's 1995 report Workers in an
Integrating World, no fewer than 78 percent of the world's workers in
manufacturing are employed today outside of the rich industrial countries.
While the contrast in wealth between richer and poorer lands continues to grow
obscenely, the migration of workers in quest of a better life has returned on a
world scale that dwarfs even that of the decades before 1914. In many parts of
the United States immigrants have once again become the key to labor's
rejuvenation. Although workers in construction and transportation continue to
play a pivotal role in labor struggles, recent union organizing has been
dominated by public employees, clerical workers, and service workers. The
prominence of women in recent struggles has given them an unprecedented (though
still inadequate) influence in shaping the character and direction of major
unions.
For all workers, the climb from powerlessness to the income and
dignity that come with having a say in governing their own lives, on the job
and in the community, requires a resurgence of collective action, which is now
so widely held in contempt. The legacy of generations past reminds us of the
goals toward which we must aspire. Only those who grapple with the present can
find the way to achieve those goals.
NOTES
1 DiGaetano interview (1959), Oral History Collection,
Reuther Archives, quoted in David Brody, "Workplace Contractualism in
Comparative Perspective," in Industrial Democracy in America: The
Ambiguous Promise ed. Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell John Harris (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 204.
2 American Federation of Labor, Report of the
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Convention of the A.F. of L. Held at
Denver, Col., Dec., 1894 (Bloomington, Ind.: 1905), 14.
3 Frank Julian Warne, The Workers at War (New York:
Century, 1920), 207.
4 James Gray Pope, "Labor's Constitution of
Freedom," Yale Law Journal 106
(Jan. 1997): 941–1031. The quotations are on pages 970
and 1,008.
5 New Majority, Jan. 3, 1920, quoted in Elizabeth
McKillen, Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914–1924
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell:, 1995), 151. On union trade links with Mexico and Russia,
see Gregg Andrews, Shoulder to Shoulder? The American Federation of Labor,
the United States, and the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1914 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991), and Steven Fraser, Labor Will Rule:
Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor (New York: Free Press, 1991).
6 Quoted in Michael J. Honey, Southern Labor and Black
Civil Rights in Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1993), 59. See also Eric Arnesen, " ’Like Banquo's Ghost, It Will
Not Down': The Race Question and the American Railroad Brotherhoods, 1880–1920,"
American Historical Review 99 (Dec. 1994): 1,601–1,633.
7 Oscar Ameringer, If You Don't Weaken (New York:
Holt, 1940), 379–80.
8 See Michael Denning, The Cultural Front: The
Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century (New York: Verso, 1996).
9 Mario T. García, Mexican Americans: Leadership,
Ideology, and Identity, 1930–1960 (New Haven Conn: Yale University Press,
1989), 145–165; García, Memories of History: The Life and Narrative of Bert
Corona (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
10 C. Wright Mills, The New Men of Power: America's
Labor Leaders (New York: Harcourt, 1948), 71–73. On employers' hiring
preferences in age, race, and education, see Richard J. Jensen, "The
Causes and Cures of Unemployment in the Great Depression," Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, 19 (spring 1989), 557–559.
11 Fraser, Labor Will Rule, 329.
12 Barbara Dianne Savage, Broadcasting Freedom: Radio,
War, and the Politics of Race, 1938–1948(Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1999), 224.
13 See Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America:
Race, Economic Policy, and the Decline of Liberalism (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 37–91; Robin D. G. Kelley, Race
Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class (New York: Free Press, 1994), 17–100.
14 Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of
Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York: Free Press, 1961).
15 Quoted in Stein, Running Steel, 73.
16 Philip S. Foner, American Labor and the Indochina
War: The Growth of Union Opposition (New York: International Publishers,
1971), 32, quoting the New York Times.
Pull
Quotes:
1
…During every period when union membership and
influence expanded rapidly…other social networks also became energized for
social change. (p.2)
2
…The prominence of women, recent immigrants,
unskilled workers…and the dramatic tactics evident in mass strikes [between
1909 and 1913] heralded a revolution in the labor movement. (p.5)
3
Union activists of all political persuasions
charged that statutes and court rulings outlawing strikes violated the
constitutional prohibition of involuntary servitude [and] refused on principle
to obey such rulings. (p.7)
4
No part of labor’s own legacy proved more
damaging…than identifying “labor” with white men and depicting people of color
as instruments of rapacious capital, ‘cheap labor’. (p.10)
5
…By the end of the 1950s few prominent
intellectuals associated their hopes for social reform with the workers’
movement. (p.24)
6
[The New Left] envisaged no role for the working
class or organized labor…despite the financial aid and expressions of support
the SDS had received from some major unions”. (p.25)
7
Immigrants have once again become the key to
labor’s rejuvenation. (p.30)